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Abstract—Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are modern
solutions for cheap and secure key storage. The security level
strongly depends on a PUF’s unpredictability, which is impaired
if certain bits of the PUF response tend towards the same
value on all devices. The expectation for the probability of 1 at
some position in the response, the Bit-Alias, is a state-of-the-art
metric in this regard. However, the confidence interval of the Bit-
Alias is never considered, which can lead to an overestimation
of a PUF’s unpredictability. Moreover, no tool is available to
verify if the Bit-Alias is within given limits. This work adapts a
method for the calculation of confidence intervals to Bit-Alias. It
further proposes a statistical hypothesis test to verify if a PUF
design meets given specifications on Bit-Alias or bit-wise entropy.
Application to several published PUF designs demonstrates the
methods’ capabilities. The results prove the need for a high
number of samples when the unpredictability of PUFs is tested.
The proposed methods are publicly available and should improve
the design and evaluation of PUFs in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for a high level of security in low-cost devices
has driven the research for cheap but secure key storage.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are promising solutions
for such applications: They permit the derivation of a secret
from chip-unique manufacturing variations, such as variations
in the threshold voltage, using standard logic gates. For this
purpose, a large class of PUFs – so called Weak PUFs or single-
challenge PUFs – consists of many measurement circuits where
each evaluates its own local variations on the chip to derive
one bit of the secret. SRAM PUFs [1] and ring-oscillator (RO)
PUFs [2] are just two prominent examples of such PUFs.
The security of this concept is ensured if an attacker cannot
read out the PUF or predict its secret response. The first is given
if the PUF is not powered, but raises the need for dedicated
runtime countermeasures while the secret is generated from
the PUF. The latter implies that an attacker who knows the
output of a large number of PUFs from equally built devices,
still cannot significantly reduce the entropy in the response of
the PUF. Therefore tests must be designed which ensure that
there is no notable statistical weakness in the random (secret)
responses of the PUF. Multiple tests have been suggested,
which measure bias [3], [4], correlations, or spatial correlations
[5], [6]. But, except for [4], [6], the accuracy of the metrics
is not assessed, which can lead to undetected flaws.
Contribution. This work builds upon the Bit-Alias [3] as
one well suited method to evaluate the unpredictability of
a certain position in the PUF response. It firstly shows how
to derive confidence intervals for the Bit-Alias to get the
accuracy of the evaluation. Secondly, a hypothesis test to verify
if the Bit-Alias is within a selectable permissible range is
introduced. The required number of test devices to provide
this guarantee with a reasonably low false acceptance rate
(FAR) is discussed. Thirdly, application to previous work and
comparison to other metrics highlights the usefulness and
limitations of our approach.
Structure. The rest of this work starts with the introduction
of confidence intervals for Bit-Alias in Sec. II. Our hypothesis
test is introduced in Sec. III. Sec. IV and Sec. V demonstrate
the application of the metric and discuss the results. A con-
clusion is drawn in Sec. VI.
II. STATISTICAL VIEW ON BIT-ALIAS
AND ITS CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
PUFs are double random: First, manufacturing variations
vary the expected behavior for each device, such as the
preferred start-up value of an SRAM cell or the frequency of
an RO; Second, noise and environmental effects impact the
behaviour at run-time. The former determines unpredictability,
the latter reliability. To properly investigate the unpredictabil-
ity of a PUF, independent samples of solely the first random
process are required. This is commonly approximated by
testing multiple devices and removing run-time randomness
by averaging multiple measurements of each device.
Under the assumption that this approach produces inde-
pendent samples, the Bit-Alias [3] tests whether individual
positions of the PUF’s noise-free response r are predictable
due to an imbalance of 1s and 0s and is defined as
pˆt =
1
N
N∑
n=1
rt,n, (1)
whereN is the number of devices and t indexes the bit position
in a device’s T bit response vector. If pˆt = 0.5, an attacker
cannot intelligently guess the response at position t.
From a statistical point of view, Eq. (1) considers each of the
T bit positions as an independent Bernoulli (Bern (pt)) dis-
tributed random variable (RV) and estimates pt, the probability
for observing a 1 at position t, by pˆt, under the assumption
that each device provides one independent realization of all T
RVs. Since the following applies equally to any position t, we
omit the index from now on.
In the given scenario, the arithmetic mean (pˆ) is the best
estimator for p, as it is unbiased and provides uniform min-
imum variance [7]. Still, the estimation can be far off p if it
is based on few or flawed samples. Therefore, the confidence
interval (CI), i.e. a range pˆl to pˆu that includes the true value
p in on average 1−α cases, has to be taken into account. The
significance level α is chosen by experience, e.g. 0.05, 0.01.
To calculate this CI, first note that estimating p of a
Bernoulli process is equivalent to estimating the proportion
of the binomial distribution that results from counting the 1s
in N repeated trials of the process. The binomial proportion
CI is a well explored problem and manifold methods can be
found in textbooks. We consider the following three useful for
the given scenario: First, the normal approximation interval
pˆl,u = pˆ± z
√
pˆ(1− pˆ)
N
, (2)
second, the Wilson’s score interval
pˆl,u =
pˆ+ z
2
2N
1 + z
2
N
±
z
1 + z
2
N
√
pˆ(1 − pˆ)
N
+
z2
4N2
(3)
both using pˆ and N from above and with
z = N−1
(
1−
α
2
, 0, 1
)
, (4)
i.e. the 1 − α
2
quantile of a standard normal distribution, and
third, the so-called exact interval by Clopper and Pearson
pˆl =
{
Beta−1
(
α
2
, x,N − x+ 1
)
x > 0
0 otherwise
pˆu =
{
Beta−1
(
1− α
2
, x+ 1, N − x
)
x < N
1 otherwise
(5)
where x is the number of 1s observed on N devices at a given
position. The last is also used in our hypothesis test in Sec. III.
Agresti and Coull [8] compared these and several other
methods. They found the normal approximation interval to
perform poorly for small N , providing either too wide CIs
for pˆ ≈ 0.5 or far too narrow CIs for pˆ close to {0, 1}.
This matches many rules of thumb which restrict the normal
approximation of a binomial distribution to large N with a
sufficient number of both 1s and 0s. The Clopper and Pearson
method provides slightly too wide CIs, because it ensures at
least 1− α coverage probability even at worst case values of
N , pˆ. In conclusion, [8] recommends Wilson’s score interval,
because its mean coverage probability is closest to – though
not necessarily above – the desired level 1−α for virtually all
values of N , pˆ. We consider this recommendation well suited
for determining the CIs after a PUF experiment.
The normal approximation can provide – despite its poor
performance in certain cases – a first estimate of the number
of devices required for testing. Reasonable CI widths in real-
world applications require sufficiently large N , cf. Fig. 1, and
p is not close to {0, 1}, cf. Fig. 2. Given, e.g., a desired CI
width pˆ∆ = 0.1 (pˆl,u = 0.5 ± 0.05), and a confidence level
α = 0.01 (z = 2.5759), the number of required test devices
can be roughly estimated via
Npˆ=0.5(pˆ∆, z) =
(
z
pˆ∆
)2
, (6)
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Figure 1. Width of CI according to Wilson’s score, Clopper-Pearson, and
normal approximation estimator over N for α = 0.01, pˆ = 0.5. A CI of
0.5± 0.1 has a width of 0.2.
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Figure 2. Width of CI according to Wilson’s score, Clopper-Pearson, and
normal approximation estimator over pˆ for α = 0.01, N = 20. A CI of
0.5± 0.1 has a width of 0.2.
resulting in 664 devices to be tested. The Clopper-Pearson
method requires 680, the Wilson’s score method 658 devices
in this setting. Note that the provided numbers are minimum
values and do not consider additional uncertainty introduced
e.g. if the samples are not perfectly independent.
Independent of the chosen estimator, pˆ∆ for fixed N also
depends on pˆ, with a maximum – i.e. the worst case – at
pˆ = 0.5, cf. Fig. 2. The Wilson’s score interval, for example,
has width 0.499 for pˆ = 0.5, but width 0.249 for pˆ = 0,
when N = 20, α = 0.01. Thus, when comparing the number
of devices for unpredictability analysis, where pˆ = 0.5 is the
optimum, and the number of repeated measurements required
for reliability analysis, where pˆ is close to 1 or 0, the former
requires twice the number of samples.
III. HYPOTHESIS TEST ON BIT-ALIAS
OR MINIMUM BIT-WISE ENTROPY
A. Test for Acceptable Bit-Alias
For the design of appropriate post-processing algorithms, a
Bit-Alias within a certain range around 0.5 must be ensured.
The following qualification test for whether the Bit-Alias of a
certain position in the response vector is sufficiently close to
0.5 is equivalent to checking whether a coin is fair. It uses the
hypothesis test that is the basis for the Clopper-Pearson CI:
Assume as null hypothesis H0 : p ≥ pu, which we aim to
reject so that the alternative hypothesis HA : p < pu remains.
We have to reject H0 if the probability of observing at most
xu 1s, i.e. the p-value, is too low under this hypothesis. Due to
the monotonicity of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs),
it is sufficient to consider the case p = pu, because for p > pu,
the probability of observing at most xu 1s is even less. We
can therefore rule out a too high Bit-Alias value if the p-value
p0,u = P [Xu ≤ xu] =
xu∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
pu
i (1− pu)
N−i
(7)
with Xu ∼ Bin (N, pu) is less than
α
2
. The limit is α
2
instead
of α, because another hypothesis test to rule out too low Bit-
Alias is to be rejected simultaneously. This second test can be
constructed identically for symmetry reasons. It has H0 : p ≤
pl, HA : p > pl, and with Xl ∼ Bin (N, pl) p-value
p0,l = P [Xl ≥ xl] =
N∑
i=xl
(
N
i
)
pl
i (1− pl)
N−i
. (8)
Reversing the calculation of pˆ∆ using Clopper-Pearson from
Sec. II provides a validation of the suggested test. For α =
0.01, N = 680, pl = 0.45, pu = 0.55 only xl = xu = 340
should allow for the rejection of both hypotheses. This ensures
that the FAR, i.e. incorrectly approving a position to be within
(pl, pu), is at most α.
The probability to observe exactly 340 1s in 680 trials,
however, is even for p = 0.5 only 0.03. It is therefore
necessary to take the false rejection rate (FRR) into account.
Once the limits xu, xl are determined from (7), (8), the
probability to accept a position with true Bit-Alias p, i.e.
X ∼ Bin (N, p), is
p1 = P [xl ≤ X ≤ xu] =
xu∑
i=xl
(
N
i
)
pi (1− p)N−i . (9)
Although p1 approaches 1 for N → ∞ if p ∈ (pl, pu), for a
real-world test, one would define (pk, pv) and choose N so
that ∀p ∈ (pk, pv) : 1 − p1 ≤ β . Due to monotonicity, again
a test for ∀p ∈ {pk, pv} : 1 − p1 ≤ β suffices. In the above
example with pl,u = 0.5 ± 0.05, α = 0.01, N = 6674 is
required to achieve β = 0.01 for pk,v = 0.5± 0.02.
B. Test for Early Termination of Experiment
From a practical point of view, testing 680 or more devices
for whether too many response bits show non-satisfying Bit-
Alias estimates is a waste of resources. Therefore, a forecast
whether it is reasonable to continue testing or abort the test
and demand a layout change or redesign is desirable. The
previous hypothesis test can easily be adapted for this purpose.
Given, e.g., N = 50 tested devices and some positions in the
response with x ≤ 10 1s, the hypothesis for the new test is
that this low value of x is by random chance and p is actually
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Figure 3. CI width achievable for α = 0.01, pˆ = 0.5 in a collection of
popular PUF publications.
at least at the lower predefined limit pl, i.e. H0 : p ≥ pl.
With Xl′ ∼ Bin (N, pl), the p-value is
p0,l′ = P [Xl′ ≤ x] =
x∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
pl
i (1− pl)
N−i
. (10)
A corresponding test for too many instead of too few 1s is
easy to construct for symmetry reasons and provides another
p-value p0,u′ . If p0,l′ or p0,u′ is below some α for too many
positions, permissible Bit-Alias values are sufficiently unlikely
to abort the test. In the above example, N = 50, pl = 0.45,
the probability for x ≤ 10 by random chance despite of a
Bit-Alias value above pl is just p0,l′ = 2 · 10−4.
C. Relation to Bit-Wise Entropy
The limits pl and pu can be represented by a minimum
Shannon- or min-entropy, because each position is assumed to
be a Bernoulli distributed RV, in which case entropy and prob-
ability can be directly calculated from each other. A minimum
min-entropy of h∞ = 0.9, relates to pu = 2
−h∞ ≈ 0.5359
and pl = 1−2−h∞ ≈ 0.4641. The example from the previous
section, p = 0.5 ± 0.05, is equivalent to a minimum min-
entropy of 0.8625 and a Shannon-entropy of 0.9928. Note that
the entropy values are given per position and their sum may
not constitute the entropy of the entire PUF due to correlation.
IV. APPLICATION TO PUBLIC PUF DATA
To emphasize the importance of CIs, Fig. 3 shows the
achievable pˆ∆ for selected publications. We examined almost
200 publications between 2002 and 2018 and reported those
which analyzed the most devices when they were published.
Additionally some high impact papers are included for com-
parison. PUF research commenced in 2002 with as few as four
devices in [2], [9] and remained with just a few devices until
Maiti et al. [3] set an early record by analyzing 125 devices
in 2010, increased to 193 devices in 2011. It took until 2018
to exceed this number, by Hesselbarth et al. [15], who are the
first that may claim to measure Bit-Alias with an accuracy
of at least better than ±0.1. This reveals a common issue in
PUF research, where claims on superior inter-class Hamming-
distance (inter-HD), Bit-Alias, or entropy are based on too
few data, especially in those papers not listed in Fig. 3, which
generally analyze less than 20 devices.
V. RELATION TO OTHER METRICS
AND OVERALL PUF TESTS
Hori et al. [4] already provided CIs for their metrics. They
utilized the fact that their metrics all calculate intermediate
values per device, which are assumed to be normal distributed
due to the central limit theorem (CLT). Under this assumption,
the CI for the mean can then be calculated using the t-
distribution [4], which leads to much tighter bounds than this
work achieved for the Bit-Alias. However, the approach in [4]
has issues. First, the applicability of the CLT is questionable:
The CLT postulates that the arithmetic mean of a sum of
independent and identically distributed (IID) RVs approaches a
normal distribution. But empirical results of strongly varying
Bit-Alias [5] contradict the assumption of identical distribu-
tion, and the observation of spatial correlations [6] contradicts
independence of RVs. Second, the metrics which Hori et al.
provide a CI for, test a mixture of several PUF properties. This
allows issues to cover each other up, e.g. too high and too low
Bit-Alias at different positions of the response, and makes the
interpretation of CIs for these metrics difficult.
Beyond the approach in this paper, adapting the CI for Bit-
Alias to other metrics such as Uniformity [3] may seem tempt-
ing. But Uniformity measures the probability for a 1 within the
response bit vector of a single device. At the same time, the
methods for CI calculation in this work assume independent
samples of the same RV. Consequently, the methods can only
be applied to Uniformity, if all positions in the response vector
of a device can be considered to be independent samples of
the same RV. This, however, does not match the observations
in previous work [6]. For other candidate metrics, similar
considerations are necessary.
Nevertheless, for a complete unpredictability evaluation of
a PUF design, additional tests are required on top of our
enhanced Bit-Alias. Currently, the distribution of inter-HD and
especially its arithmetic mean, named Uniqueness [3], are usu-
ally tested. Uniqueness, however, is entirely determined by the
Bit-Alias values [16]. Testing the Bit-Alias thus automatically
ensures that the Uniqueness is within limits, and has additional
benefits: First, higher sensitivity, i.e. the numeric value of the
respective Bit-Aliases changes more strongly than that of the
Uniqueness, if a certain part of the response vector deviates
by a certain amount from equiprobability. Second, location
information, meaning that contrary to Uniqueness, the Bit-
Aliases show exactly which positions of the response bit string
are biased. This helps the designer to locate potential layout
errors faster, but may also serve in a security assessment.
However, all current standard tests such as Bit-Alias,
Uniqueness, or Uniformity, fail to identify correlations within
the response vectors. Therefore, a test of the inter-HD dis-
tribution, especially its tails, or a correlation test between
positions in the response vector as in [6] is mandatory. While
we consider the problem of evaluating the Bit-Alias per
position solved with the additional methods presented in this
work, especially the consideration of correlations between PUF
response bits and the computation of confidence intervals for
Uniformity or a similar metric leaves room for improvement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, one important metric for the unpredictability of
a PUF, the Bit-Alias, is enhanced by introducing a correspond-
ing confidence interval. A hypothesis test is defined to verify
whether each position in the response string complies with
given limits on Bit-Alias or entropy. The suggested confidence
interval is applied to previous work, demonstrating that even
the most elaborate large-scale tests only reach an accuracy
of approximately ±0.1 for their estimations of Bit-Alias at
α = 0.01. These results, together with the proposed hypothesis
test, emphasize the demand for a high number of test devices
in PUF research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was partly funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) through grant number SI 2064/1-1. Permanent ID and revision
date of this document:
001624aa04a823c02fd54d3ca29883b932c6f9ee 2019-04-16
REFERENCES
[1] J. Guajardo et al., “FPGA intrinsic PUFs and their use for IP protection,”
in CHES. Springer, 2007, pp. 63–80.
[2] B. Gassend et al., “Silicon physical random functions,” in CCS. ACM,
2002, pp. 148–160.
[3] A. Maiti et al., “A large scale characterization of RO-PUF,” in HOST.
IEEE, 2010, pp. 94–99.
[4] Y. Hori et al., “Quantitative and statistical performance evaluation of
arbiter physical unclonable functions on FPGAs,” in ReConFig. IEEE,
2010, pp. 298–303.
[5] F. Wilde, M. Hiller, and M. Pehl, “Statistic-based security analysis of
ring oscillator PUFs,” in ISIC. IEEE, 2014, pp. 148–151.
[6] F. Wilde, B. M. Gammel, and M. Pehl, “Spatial correlation analysis
on physical unclonable functions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 1468–1480, 6 2018.
[7] C. Klu¨ppelberg, “Einfu¨hrung in die Statistik,” 2018, lecture notes at
Technical University of Munich.
[8] A. Agresti and B. A. Coull, “Approximate is better than ”exact”
for interval estimation of binomial proportions,” The American
Statistician, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 119–126, 1998. [Online]. Available:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2685469
[9] R. S. Pappu, “Physical one-way functions,” Ph.D. dissertation, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001.
[10] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical unclonable functions for device
authentication and secret key generation,” in DAC. ACM, 2007, pp.
9–14.
[11] Y. Su, J. Holleman, and B. P. Otis, “A digital 1.6 pJ/bit chip identification
circuit using process variations,” IEEE J. Solid-State Circuits, vol. 43,
no. 1, pp. 69–77, 2008.
[12] S. Katzenbeisser et al., “PUFs: Myth, fact or busted? a security evalua-
tion of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) cast in silicon,” in CHES.
Springer, 2012, pp. 283–301.
[13] R. Maes, A. Van Herrewege, and I. Verbauwhede, “PUFKY: a fully
functional PUF-based cryptographic key generator,” in CHES. Springer,
2012, pp. 302–319.
[14] F. Wilde, “Large scale characterization of SRAM on Infineon XMC mi-
crocontrollers as PUF,” in 4th Workshop on Cryptography and Security
in Computing Systems (CS2 2017) HIPEAC17, Stockholm, 1 2017.
[15] R. Hesselbarth et al., “Large scale RO PUF analysis over slice type,
evaluation time and temperature on 28nm xilinx FPGAs,” in HOST.
IEEE, 4 2018, pp. 126–133.
[16] M. Pehl, M. Hiller, and H. Graeb, “Efficient evaluation of physical
unclonable functions using entropy measures,” Journal of Circuits,
Systems and Computers, vol. 25, no. 01, p. 1640001, 2016.
